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Introduction
Political polarization has been commonly observed in American Politics. Abramowitz
and Saunders (2005) found that while the majority of Americans are moderate, there are deep
divisions between Democrats and Republics, driven by activist and elites on both sides. These
divisions have translated into polarization on political issues between the two parties. Increasing
trends of polarization have pushed the ideologies of liberals and conservatives further apart in
recent decades (Hetherington 2009). This split is most evident in certain social issues, which
have resulted in culture wars in American politics. In this study, I analyze the relationship
between judicial decision making on the Supreme Court and polarization. I look at both the legal
model and the attitudinal model of judicial decision making. To find support for the legal model,
I should expect to see justices that are uninfluenced by their personal preferences while using
legal arguments to support their decisions. If there is support for the attitudinal model, then I
should expect to see justices making decisions based on their political preferences. In this study,
I examine seven landmark Supreme Court cases that deal with the polarized issue of LGBTQ
rights, and compare the language used by justices in their written opinions. Through a linguistic
analysis of the opinions, I anticipate observing evidence of polarization in the different languages
used by justices from different ideological persuasions.
Research Question
Does the political polarization that is commonly observed in other American institutions translate
into an institution like the Supreme Court?
Literature Review
Political polarization has been commonly observed in American politics and has drawn
recent scholarly interest (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006, Poole and Rosenthal 1984,

Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, Hetherington 2009, Fiorina and Abrams 2008, Baum and
Groeling 2008, Abramowitz and Saunders 2005). In recent years, trends of polarization have
appeared to increase in Congress, with Democrats and Republican camps drifting further and
further apart (Hertherington 2009). Americans appear to be deeply split on many social issues
that have come to be part of the American culture wars. According to the legal model of judicial
decision making, decisions handed down by the Supreme Court should be unaffected by these
trends of polarization. However, recent scholarship finds empirical support against this
assumption, and questions the role of polarization within the Court.
In Putting Polarization in Perspective, Marc Hetherington (2009) touches upon
polarization trends among elite and mass levels. He uses DW-NOMINATE scores, a common measure
of ideology created by Poole and Rosenthal to map the ideology of members of Congress. From
these scores, Hetherington (2009) asserts that clear polarization exists among political elites and
writes, “The process of partisan polarization in Congress has been occurring over time…Starting
with the 97th Congress, the parties began to grow apart steadily and sometimes dramatically”
(p.417). Hetherington (2009) also seeks to identify the origins of current polarization within
Congress. He argues that these causes can be traced to the 1950s and 1960s when differences
between parties were relatively small. He attributes the Democratic Party’s embrace of civil
rights as a key factor that caused white southern conservatives to depart from the party. This
caused the displacement of conservative southern Democrats with more conservative southern
Republicans (Hetherington 2009). African Americans receiving the right to vote also caused
more liberals to be elected to office. Hetherington (2009) also describes changes in the north-east
as another contributing factor to present day polarization. He describes the northeastern United
States in the following way: “Although among the most liberal areas in the country, it long had a

tradition of electing liberal Republicans. As the national image of the Republican party grew
more conservative, however, these states turned increasingly to liberal Democrats” (Hetherington
2009 p.421). According to Hetherington (2009), these patterns were reflected in Congress as
early as the 1980s. He argues that this caused greater differences between parties, but also caused
the activists within the parties to grow more homogenous. Hetherington (2009) also points out
that not only have party lines changed regionally, but changes have occurred within both of the
parties over time, with Republicans becoming increasingly more conservative and Democrats
becoming more liberal. His explanation for this is that interest groups reinforce polarization
through monetary contributions that are aimed towards ideological extremes on both sides
(Hetherington 2009).
Hetherington’s (2009) analysis provides evidence of polarization within Congress and
identifies the root causes of polarizations between the two parties. However, it is not yet known
whether this polarization also applies to the Supreme Court. If it is true that the Court is insulated
from broader political pressures, then we can expect that the Court will not be plagued by the
same political polarization seen in Congress, since its general purpose is not to further ideology,
but rather to interpret the law as it applies to the Constitution.
Tom Clark (2009) explains why studying polarization on the Supreme Court is important.
Political controversy over Supreme Court nominations and the steady politicization of
that process during the latter half of the twentieth century, the deep entrenchment of the
notion that ideological preferences drive decision making on the Court, and heated
political battles over the Court’s role in making national policy are just some of the
reasons why scholars and policy officials alike ought to be interested in the degree of
ideological polarization on the Court (Clark 2009 p.154).
In addition to providing reasons for why this area of study is important, Clark (2009) also
assesses different methods that could be used for measuring ideological polarization on the
Court. Clark (2009) used the Esteban and Ray (1994) measure to track polarization on the Court,

which looks at both intergroup alienation and intragroup identification. This method allows
scholars to measure polarization on the Court by assessing both homogeneity and heterogeneity
among justices, with polarization decreasing with homogeneity and increasing with
heterogeneity. Clark (2009) also assessed the relationship between ideological polarization and
fractured decision making on the Court by examining dissents, cases decided during a term with
at least one dissenting opinion, and cases decided by a one-vote majority. Through this analysis
he found that there was a larger portion of cases decided with a dissent than cases decided by one
vote, but both were correlated with polarization. He concludes that “polarization is indeed
strongly related to (1) the proportion of cases that are decided with dissent, and (2) the
proportion of cases decided by a one-vote majority” (Clark 2009 p.154). Clark (2009) argues that
an increase in ideological polarization on the Supreme Court is associated with a Court that has
an increase in published dissents and one vote majorities.
Concurring opinions may also provide insight to the level of polarization on the Supreme
Court because separate opinion writing reflects different views about interpretation of the law.
Pamela Corley (2010) has written extensively about the importance of concurring opinions on
the Court. She builds on the groundbreaking work of Segal and Spaeth (2002) who argue that
concurring opinions are written by justices who are ideologically closer to the majority opinion
than justices who have dissented. Corley (2010) studied concurrences by breaking them up into
five different types; expansive, doctrinal, limiting, reluctant, and emphatic. According to Corley
(2010), the purpose of an expansive concurrence is to expand the holding of the majority
opinion. Doctrinal concurrences differ because they offer a different legal reasoning for the
majority decision. Limiting concurrences attempt to limit the majority opinion, while reluctant
concurrences express the justice’s desire to explain why they felt compelled to join an opinion

that they did not want to join. Finally, emphatic concurrences clarify the majority opinion by
emphasizing part of the Court’s reasoning (Corley 2010). When analyzing these types of
concurrences with the ideological compatibility of justices, Corley (2010) found that
ideological compatibility between the justice and the majority opinion writer,
interacted with the ideological direction of the majority decision, decreases the
likelihood of a reluctant concurrence; however, this variable has no effect on
writing or joining an expansive or limiting concurrence (p.33).
According to this finding, the ideology of individual justices only plays a significant role in the
writing of reluctant occurrences. However, Corley (2010) found that when looking at casespecific factors, the political importance of the case was correlated with emphatic and expansive
concurrences, a factor that Unah and Hancock (2006) examined in great detail on their research
on case salience.
In their research, Unah and Hancock (2006) explore how ideological preferences affect
high salience and low salience cases. They argue that the attitudinal model, which explains
judicial decision making by the personal preference of the justices, can be used to explain
decisions reached in cases that are high in salience but not in low salience cases. High salience
cases are defined as cases that involve important issues, which, in turn, attract more attention.
They looked at civil rights cases in their study and code the salience of the cases by determining
whether the decision was published on the first page of the New York Times the day after the
decision (2006). They explained the results of their research in the following way:
We can state definitively that the effect of ideology in the United States Supreme Court is
regulated by the salience of the case presented for review. When a case is highly
politically salient, the attitudinal model predicts an additional 17% increase in the
probability that the Court would rule liberally, holding other variables constant. We
believe the reason for this outcome is that case salience references the values of the
justices more directly by raising their interest and attention in the case to a higher level
(Unah and Hancock 2006 p.307).

Additionally, Unah and Hancock (2006) found that the attitudinal model was less predictive of
the outcome of cases with lower salience.
Thomas Keck (2014) takes a different approach in analyzing the role of ideology in
judicial decision making by assessing the role of the Court in the modern polarized political
environment. He does so by focusing on the polarizing issues of abortion, same sex marriage,
affirmative action, and gun control. Keck (2014) first focuses on how these issues are fought
through the Court from both the left and the right. He then addresses the role of justices
themselves on the Court, arguing that
…judges appear to act more like partisans when the constitutional issue before
them focuses directly on a key culture war concern and less like partisans when
called on to police the process by which such culture war concerns will be
addressed, even if those latter decisions might have a substantial impact on
ultimate outcomes (Keck 2014 p.140).
Keck (2014) points out that,
if we expect judges to be nonpartisan umpires, then any non-zero difference
between the aggregate votes of Democratic and Republican judges would seem to
indicate a troubling pattern of polarization. But if we expect judges to be partisan
zealots, then any difference below 100 percent would seem to indicate some
measure of neutral umpiring (p.148).
When comparing the Court with voters, the two appear to have similar levels of polarization over
culture war topics. However, when compared to Congress, Keck (2014) finds that the Court
appears drastically less polarized. “If judges were simply behaving as legislators, their votes
would diverge along partisan lines far more sharply than they actually do” (Keck 2014, p.148149). Keck’s (2014) findings suggest that justices are not as politically neutral as suggested by
the legal model, but are also not seeking to pursue their own political preferences as suggested
by the attitudinal model. His argument appears to instead land in the strategic model camp,
which argues that justices act within legal constraints while having individual policy preferences.

The alignment of the views of Supreme Court justices and Congress was recognized
some time ago by Robert Dahl (1957), who explained that the views of the Court are never for
long out of line with the views of lawmaking majorities because Supreme Court justices are
regularly appointed to the Court by elected policymakers. According to Dahl (1957), “Presidents
are not famous for appointing justice’s hostile to their own views on public policy nor could they
expect to secure confirmation of a man whose stance on key questions was flagrantly at odds
with that of the dominant majority in the Senate” (p. 284). He notes that throughout the history
of the Court, a new justice was appointed every twenty-two months, on average. “Thus a
president can expect to appoint about two new justices during one term in office” (Dahl 1957 p.
284). Therefore, through the appointment process of the Court, justices are appointed that have
policy views that align with the current lawmaking majority. If this is the case, then the judicial
branch will lag behind the dominating policy views found in the legislative and executive
branch. Under this assumption, the dominating policy views on the Court are never too far
behind the dominating policy views of the lawmaking majority (Dahl 1957 p. 284).
There has been a great deal of scholarship written on the role of polarization and ideology
on the Supreme Court. While Clark (2009) identified polarization by looking at dissents in Court
decisions, Corley (2010) found the presence of political importance in concurrences. Unah and
Hancock (2006), instead, chose to look at the role of salience in judicial decision making, and
found that cases of higher salience were predicted by the attitudinal model. Keck (2014) took yet
an even different approach, and focused instead on how the Court was used to pursue polarized
issues, finding that while justices displayed trends of polarization, they did not mirror those of
Congress. Dahl (1957) argued that the Court is a political body that lags behind the legislative
and executive branch regarding policy preferences. All of these studies found support for

polarization on the Court in some way, ultimately rejecting the legal model of judicial decision
making.
The research conducted in this study seeks to further inform the discussion regarding the
presence of polarization on the Court. I intend to add to the existing body of research by studying
the language used by the Court in LGBTQ cases, to see if there is evidence of polarization across
ideological lines. In doing so, I hope to add a new perspective of how polarization can be studied
on the Court.
Theory Section
One view of the Supreme Court is that it is an insulated body unaffected by public
opinion. Since justices on the Court are granted lifetime appointments by the executive branch
and do not face reelection, and are arguably not held accountable by the public. Under this view,
justices on the Court decide on the basis of legal interpretations that may be unpopular amongst
the public. This view of the Court as an insulated body falls in line with the legal model of
judicial decision making, which assumes that justices use legal techniques to make decisions on
cases brought before them. Under this theory, justices are assumed to use the application of legal
principles, such as stare decisis, and the interpretation of legal texts, to arrive at a decision. The
model suggests that justices will use legal methods of interpretation, such as textualism or
originalism to interpret the Constitution. Segal and Spaeth (2002) describe the legal model as the
belief that “the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light
of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and/or precedent”
(p. 48). The model also suggests that justices are uninfluenced by personal preferences in their
decisions. Stare decisis is central to the legal model, because justices are expected to pursue
stability in the law. “The practice of stare decisis is a central assumption of most explanations of

principles legal choice or the legal model because, if a justice does not practice reliance on the
holdings of the Court’s past decisions about the Constitution, statutes, and the case law, there is
little reason to believe that the justice believes in making decisions because of the law” (Brisbin
1996 p. 1005). This model assumes that justices will follow stare decisis even if it goes against
their own personal preferences. If I expect to see support for the legal model, I should see
justices using legal techniques to make their decisions.
Another view of the Court is less as a legal institution and more as a political body. As
earlier mentioned, Dahl suggests that the Court is a political body that is never too far behind the
dominant policy views of the lawmaking majority. This political view of the Court is featured in
the attitudinal model. The attitudinal model of judicial decision making identifies the personal
policy preferences justices hold as the key influence in their decisions. Segal and Spaeth (2002)
hold these policy preferences as the strongest influence on how a judge will vote on a case.
Under this theory, it is assumed that justices will disregard legal methods of decision making,
such as stare decisis, if they do not align with their political preferences. If I expect to see
support for the attitudinal model on the court, I should see justices disregarding legal techniques
and voting based off of their policy preferences.
Methods
For my methods I began by reviewing relevant literature about the Supreme Court and
models of judicial decision making. I then chose seven landmark Supreme Court cases that dealt
with the polarized issue of LGBTQ rights. All of the cases chosen were featured on the front
page of the New York Times the day after the cases were decided, displaying the salience of the
cases. These cases were: Bowers v Hardwick (1986), Romer v. Evans (1996), Boy Scouts v Dale
(2000), Lawrence v Texas (2003), U.S. v Windsor (2013), Hollingsworth v Perry (2013), and

Obergefell v Hodges (2015). I used Nvivo to code the majority opinions, concurrences, and
dissents, as well as the Justices who authored each opinion. I used the Supreme Court database to
determine if Justices who authored opinions were conservative, moderate, or liberal. I then ran
word frequency tests to make word clouds, including stemmed words, for each ideological group
to compare the language used by Justices with different political preferences. I also looked at the
summaries from the word frequency tests to see the number of times different words were used,
and the weighted percentage of the words in the written opinions.
Results
When reviewing the opinions in these cases, I discovered that liberals did not play an
active role in authoring opinions. The majority of opinions were written by either moderate or
conservative justices. While liberal justices authored one majority opinion and four dissenting
opinions, moderate justices authored five majority opinions, one concurring opinion and three
dissenting opinions. Conservatives authored one majority opinion, one concurring opinion and
six dissenting opinions. Because of this, there were less data to analyze regarding the language
that was used by liberal justices. In many of the cases, especially those written by Justice
Kennedy, liberal justices joined the opinions written by moderates. When looking at the voting
records of the seven selected cases, the Court voted along ideological lines in all but one case.
Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) was the only case in which justices did not vote in ideological
blocs. However, the key issue of disagreement among the justices in the opinions dealt with
whether or not there was standing to bring the case, not the issue that addressed the LGBTQ
community itself. In every other case the votes were divided between the liberal justices and
conservative justice, with moderates acting as the tiebreakers.

When looking at the language used in the opinions, liberals, moderates, and conservatives
all used legal language in high frequencies. “Courts,” “laws”, “states,” “rights,” “constitution,”
and “case” were among the most commonly used words across all three groups. This suggests
Figure 1: Frequency of Legal Words Used in Opinions
Liberals
Word

Moderate

Conservative

Courts

Word
Count
94

Weighted Word
Percentage Count
0.93%
473

Weighted Word Count Weighted
Percentage
Percentage
1.70%
313
1.53%

States

107

1.06%

490

1.76%

298

1.45%

Laws

110

1.09%

426

1.53%

280

1.36%

Rights

133

1.32%

270

0.97%

183

0.89%

Constitution 55

0.55%

212

0.76%

176

0.86%

Case

0.72%

187

0.67%

97

0.47%

72

that all three groups referenced legal techniques when authoring their opinions in these cases.
However, when looking further down the list, the linguistic techniques begin to change by
ideology. “Protection” and “equal” were used in higher frequencies by moderates than by liberals
and conservatives. Liberals, on the other hand, referenced “privacy” and “discrimination” in
higher percentages than moderates and conservatives (the number of times they referenced the
words were lower due to the lack of opinions written, however, across the opinions that were
written by liberals they referenced these words in higher percentages). Conservatives referenced
“tradition” at much higher rates than both liberals and moderates in the opinions they authored
Figure 2: Frequency of Words Used in Opinions
Liberals

Moderate

Conservative

Word
Protection

Word
Count
53

Weighted Word
Percentage Count
0.53%
179

Weighted Word
Percentage Count
0.64%
117

Weighted
Percentage
0.57%

Equal

13

0.13%

100

0.36%

48

0.23%

Private

52

0.52%

68

0.25%

37

0.18%

Tradition

11

0.11%

46

0.17%

70

0.34%

Discrimination 26

0.26%

41

0.15%

34

0.17%

Precedent

0.01%

37

0.13%

10

0.05%

1

on LGBTQ cases. These differences in language correlate with the policy preferences of justices.
When looking at the history of interpretation of the Due Process clause on the Court, it is evident
that liberals and conservatives have different interpretations of what constitutes a fundamental
right. Conservatives tend to rely more on tradition and history to determine what is considered
fundamental. In LGBTQ cases, this translates into the use of Judeo-Christian traditionalism and
morality arguments to support their assertion against LGBTQ rights as fundamental. Liberals and
moderates on the other hand, rely much more heavily on ideals of privacy when discussing
fundamental rights. When reviewing LGBTQ cases, liberals invoke the right to privacy as
justification for greater protection of rights. The differences in these arguments are reflective of
the differences in policy preferences between the groups. Additionally, it is important to note that
when justices used certain language, they were using it in an argument to discredit an opposing
viewpoint. For example, when conservatives referenced privacy in their dissents, it was often to
discredit the right to privacy argument that was used by the majority. This distinction provides
even greater insight into how separated justices viewpoints were based on their political
preferences. Even when justices from different political groups used similar language, it was

often only to discredit the arguments made by their more liberal or more conservative colleagues.
This suggests the presence of polarization, since there was little overlap in the reasoning made by
different ideological groups. All three groups referenced “precedent” in very low frequencies,
with liberals only using the word once out of all five of their authored opinions. If the legal
model was correct in assuming that justices use legal techniques such as stare decisis to make
their decisions, then precedent should have been referenced in much higher frequencies.
These different interpretations of what constitutes a right as fundamental under the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, could be viewed as legal differences amongst
judges if they were not linked with political preferences. However, since the differences in
thought are found specifically along ideological lines, this suggests that political preferences play
a key role in how the justices decided to vote on these cases.
Conclusion
My hypothesis stated that I expected to see support for the attitudinal model through the
use of polarized language on the court. If I were to find support for the legal model of judicial
decision making, then I should see justices using legal standards to make their decisions, and that
they should not be influenced by their personal preferences. If I expected to see support for the
attitudinal model, then I should see a trend in justices’ judicial decisions based on their political
preferences. I found that all of the justices used legal arguments to support their decisions,
however the legal arguments they used were influenced by their ideology. Justices from different
ideologies all used similar legal words –words like “court,” “right,” “states,” or “Constitution” –
most frequently. However, despite the similar legal language, justices reached different
conclusions on the cases. When looking at the ideology of the justices, it is evident that the
voting record for LGBTQ cases, with one exception, were split along ideological lines in all of

the cases. If we look past the legal words that were used the most frequently by justices, we
begin to see polarized language present in the opinions. Words such as “tradition” were used in
higher frequencies by Conservatives, while words like “private” or “privacy” were used in higher
frequencies by liberals and moderates. This indicates that justices use legal arguments to support
decisions made based on their political preferences. This supports the attitudinal model, as
justices relied on their political preferences to reach decisions on the cases. However, looking at
the language used in the cases, it is apparent that while justices followed their personal ideology
in making their decisions, they then wrapped these decisions in legal justifications. The evidence
presented in this study adds to the growing body of work examining the Court as a political
body. The results find support for the attitudinal model, and suggest that political polarization
does indeed translate into an institution like the Supreme Court. This study has been a
preliminary look into the topic of polarization on the Supreme Court, and there is room for
further research regarding how language use by justices can be used to find evidence of
polarization. Further research can explore how this phenomenon occurs across other polarized
issues that come before the court.
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